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Abstract: Scholars often assume that Aristotle uses the terms morphē and eidos 
interchangeably. Translators of Aristotle's works rarely feel the need to carry the dis-
tinction between these two Greek terms over into English. This article challenges the 
orthodox view that morphē and eidos are synonymous. Careful analysis of texts from 
the Categories, Physics, and Metaphysics in which these terms appear in close proximity 
reveals a fundamental tension of Aristotle's thinking concerning the being of natural 
beings. Morphē designates the form as inseparable from the matter in which it inheres, 
while eidos, because it is more easily separated from matter, is the vocabulary used to 
determine form as the ontological principle of the composite individual. The tension 
between morphē and eidos—between form as irreducibly immanent and yet somehow 
separate—is then shown to animate Aristotle's phenomenological approach to the 
being of natural beings. This approach is most clearly enacted in Aristotle's biology, a 
consideration of which concludes the essay.
For there is also a need to examine how it is necessary to speak about each 
thing, but it is necessary not to say more than how [each thing] is.
—Metaphysics Z.4, 1030a27–28
For in all natural beings there is something wonderful.
—Parts of Animals I.5, 645a16–17
A perplexing reduplication appears in the way Aristotle speaks about form. At decisive moments in the Physics and Metaphysics, we hear what sounds like 
an echo, for when Aristotle designates the formal side of the composite, he often 
says morfhv and ei\do~ together.1 Our predecessors have, for the most part, heard 
this as a simple repetition. They either explicitly assert that the two terms are 
synonymous, or implicitly suggest as much by translating the two by the single 
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word ‘form.’2 Although it is perhaps tempting to hear “hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\do~” as a 
mere repetition of the same, Aristotle’s insistence that the various ways we speak 
about beings disclose something of the truth of those beings advises against this. 
Perhaps it would be more appropriate to follow the intuition that guides so much 
of Aristotle’s own thinking by attending to the ways morfhv and ei\do~ echo off of 
one another, each pulling in a direction of its own.
To anticipate: if morfhv, as shape, remains irreducibly connected to the 
contingent individual, and ei\do~, as the ‘look’ of something or its class, kind or 
species, pulls in the direction of the visual and the universal, then it is perhaps no 
hyperbole to suggest that Aristotle’s thinking concerning the meaning of fi nite, 
sensible oujsiva is haunted by the tension between morfhv and ei\do~. This tension 
is heard most poignantly in the middle books of the Metaphysics where the at-
tempt to defi ne oujsiva and so to establish a general ejpisthvmh of being qua being 
collides with Aristotle’s unwillingness to sacrifi ce the ontological autarchy of the 
individual for the sake of such a science.3 In the face of this tension, Aristotle’s 
thinking turns to a sort of phenomenology that dwells in intimate association 
with natural beings, deriving its defi nitions from a rigorous engagement with the 
things themselves. By listening attentively to how Aristotle says morfhv and ei\do~ 
together in the Physics and Metaphysics, we will hear how his ontological engage-
ment with fi nite, sensible oujsiva leads to the biological works in which precisely 
such a phenomenological approach is pursued.
A Preliminary Sense of the Difference: The Categories
In order to gain a preliminary sense of the subtle but important difference between 
morfhv and ei\do~, let us listen to how form is said in the Categories. In chapter eight, 
Aristotle considers the various senses of toiovthta, or qualities. The fourth sense he 
comes upon is that of the morfhv or sch`ma of each being, that is, its shape or outward 
appearance. Aristotle says: “And each being, with respect to its morfhv, is said to be 
something of a certain sort.”4 Here morfhv is closely associated with sch`ma, both of 
which are understood to designate the physical shape of something and so to determine 
the sort of being it is. However, in the Categories such qualitative determinations are 
not ontologically substantive and so morfhv does not yet seem to take on the ontological 
signifi cance it will have in the Physics and Metaphysics. Here it is a mere quality.
And yet already in the Categories there is a tendency to ascribe some degree of 
ontological effi cacy to certain kinds of qualities. Specifi cally, a secondary oujsiva, 
that is, an ei\do~ or a gevno~, is said to signify “a certain quality.”5 But secondary 
oujsivai are not mere qualities, like the white that signifi es a quality and nothing 
more; rather, as Aristotle writes, “the ei\do~ or the gevno~ determines the quality in 
relation to an oujsiva, for it signifi es that an oujsiva is qualifi ed in some way.”6 Here 
Aristotle suggests that secondary oujsivai determine the being of primary oujsivai 
Aristotle’s Phenomenology of Form 437
in some ontologically more fundamental way than do mere qualities. However, we 
hear in these texts a certain hesitancy, for although Aristotle seems to ascribe some 
ontological effi cacy to the ei\do~, atomic individuals retain ontological primacy.
This hesitancy is heard in the way Aristotle attends to how beings are said—
levgesqai. To be said-of a subject is to determine that subject in some ontologically 
signifi cant way: being is disclosed through lovgo~. Yet what is said-of a subject, 
to; ei\do~, is itself said to be “a certain quality” [poiovn ti shmaivnei]. As so often in 
Aristotle, we must attend to the little indefi nite pronoun ‘ti,’ for it marks at once 
Aristotle’s reluctance to grant ei\do~ ultimate ontological authority over the indi-
vidual and yet also his unwillingness to reduce the ei\do~ to a mere quality. While 
such qualities are not said-of subjects, they do inhere in them. The fundamental 
difference, then, between ei\do~ and morfhv in the Categories is that ei\do~, as that 
which is said-of a subject but not present-in a subject, determines the being of 
oujsiva in a way that morfhv, which merely inheres in the subject, does not. Ironically, 
however, when Aristotle begins to think the uJpokeivmenon, or underlying subject, 
itself as a composite, as he does in the Physics, these two ways of saying form are 
brought together. The said-of dimension of to; ei\do~ is posited as inhering-in 
the individual itself—ei\do~ becomes more like morfhv. While for its part, morfhv 
becomes more like ei\do~ insofar as it is given an ontological role in determining 
the being of the composite. Let us turn to the Physics, where this transformation 
of form can be heard most distinctly.
Thinking MORFHV and EI\DO~ Together: The Physics
Having established that accidental change requires three principles, two contrar-
ies and a uJpokeivmenon, Aristotle attempts in Physics I.7 to map this model onto 
unqualifi ed becoming or substantial generation.7 In turning his attention to the 
generation of natural beings, however, a certain ambiguity emerges in the three 
principle model of change, for the uJpokeivmenon does not seem to remain constantly 
present through the process by which natural beings come into being. Aristotle’s 
own example suggests as much, for even as he claims that “there is always some-
thing underlying from which that which is generated [comes to be],” he appeals 
to the example of plants and animals that come from a spevrmato~, or seed. The 
problem here is that the seed itself changes and develops during the process of 
generation. An implicit recognition of the inadequacy of the static conception 
of the uJpokeivmenon to account for natural generation leads to a sort of crises in 
Aristotle’s thinking concerning the being and becoming of ta; fusikav. This crises 
is marked by Aristotle’s vacillation concerning the precise number of principles 
required to account for natural generation.
Such moments of vacillation allow us to hear Aristotle’s thinking at work.8 In 
this case, the question concerning whether the principles of being and becoming 
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are two or three is wrapped up with and worked out through the tension between 
morfhv and ei\do~. This is most evident in the diffi cult second half of Physics I.7 
where, after Aristotle introduces the example of the seed and suggests that that 
which is generated is always a composite, he gives the following account of the 
meaning of the terms uJpokeivmenon and ajntikeivmenon: “I mean by the to be opposite 
[ajntikei`sqai], the unmusical, but by the to lie under [uJpokei`sqai] the human being, 
and the absence of sch`ma [ajschmosuvnhn] and the absence of morfhv [ajmorfivan] 
and the disorder is an opposite, but the bronze or stone or gold is a uJpokeivmenon.”9 
Here as Aristotle begins to think the composite in terms of the distinction between 
form and matter, the gesture is not to the concrete appearance of an ei\do~ in a 
particular parcel of matter, but to an absence of morfhv, to a sort of disorder that 
uncovers a deeper, more dynamic understanding of the uJpokeivmenon. In Physics 
I.9, the uJpokeivmenon is determined fi rst as matter and then, in a decisive move, 
as duvnami~, potency: the power that reaches out to, indeed, yearns for its form.10 
However, at the end of Physics I.7, the vocabulary of duvnami~ is not yet deployed 
to think the uJpokeivmenon in relation to stevrhsi~, or the deprivation of form. Here 
the strange appearance of absence gives rise to a vacillation in Aristotle’s thinking 
concerning the number of principles of being and becoming.
Aristotle’s insistence that “everything that is generated is generated from a 
uJpokeivmenon and a morfhv” suggests that the principles are two in number.11 How-
ever, he goes on to consider that the uJpokeivmenon is itself one in number but two in 
ei[dei.12 The shift from the vocabulary of morfhv to ei\do~ allows Aristotle to isolate 
the formal dimension of the composite and thus to think more deeply into the 
dynamics of its coming into being. Once this shift is accomplished, Aristotle goes 
on to suggest that in one sense we need to speak about the principles as two: the 
uJpokeivmenon and the ei\do~, which itself seems to be responsible for the order and 
unity of the composite. But in another sense, the principles need to be spoken of 
as three, for the deprivation, or stevrhsi~, seems also to play a role along with the 
ei\do~ in determining the being of the composite.13 The tension at work in Aristotle’s 
thinking at this point is well expressed in the following passage: “And it is clear 
that something must underlie the contraries and that the contraries are two. But in 
another way this is not necessary, for it would be suffi cient for one of the contraries 
to produce the change by its absence or presence.”14 The shift in vocabulary from 
morfhv to ei\do~ brings with it a shift in the way in which the form is understood 
to function ontologically. Now the very presence or absence of the ei\do~ is said to 
produce the change. Generation is here thought as a kind of coming to presence.
Although the vocabulary of stevrhsi~ allows Aristotle to think generation as 
the coming-to-presence of an ei\do~, the danger of this sort of formulation is that 
the ontological principle will be hypostasized, posited as existing outside of the 
concrete composite whose principle it is. To mitigate against this, Aristotle draws 
our attention away from a consideration of form in isolation from the composite 
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back to the intimate connection between the uJpokeivmenon and its form. Here the 
vocabulary of morfhv returns. Aristotle writes:
But the nature of the uJpokeivmenon is known by analogy. For as bronze is to a 
statue, or wood is to a bed, or as that which is shapeless [a[morfon] before it 
takes on the morfhv is to any of the other things that have morfhv, so this [that 
is, the nature of the uJpokeivmenon] is to an oujsiva or to a tovde ti or to being. 
This then is one principle, although it is not one nor a being in the manner of 
a tovde ti, and one principle is the lovgo~ of it, and also there is what is contrary 
to this, the stevrhsi~.15
This passage expresses a transformation of the meaning of both the uJpokeivmenon 
and the ei\do~. Whereas in the Categories, the uJpokeivmenon had referred simply to a 
determinate atomic individual like a horse or a human being, here it is understood 
analogically as matter before its taking shape. The absence of the vocabulary of 
duvnami~ can be heard in the way Aristotle emphasizes the shifted conception of 
the uJpokeivmenon negatively by insisting that although the uJpokeivmenon is one prin-
ciple, it is not one in the sense of being a tovde ti—that is, it is not a demonstrably 
identifi able individual. For its part, the ei\do~, which had just been imbued with 
new ontological authority, is again called morfhv so as to emphasize its internal 
operation in determining the being of the tovde ti. When, at the end of the pas-
sage, the formal dimension of the composite is again isolated, the morfhv is called 
lovgo~ and stevrhsi~ emerges as a third kind of principle.
We hear in this confl uence of ways of saying form—morfhv, ei\do~, lovgo~, 
stevrhsi~—a thinking assiduously attentive to the manner in which the tovde ti 
comes to presence. In Physics II.1, Aristotle further refi nes the complex interaction 
of these various ways of saying form as he attends ever more closely to the coming to 
presence of ta; fusikav: “Thus, nature is said in one way as the fi rst matter underlying 
each of the things having in themselves the principle of movement and change, but 
in another way, as hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\do~ to; kata; to;n lovgon—as the shape, that is, the 
look, the one in accordance with speech.”16 The translation is admittedly awkward; 
but this is to allow what is expressed in the words to be heard more acutely. The 
kaiv here is taken as appositional so that hJ morfhv may be heard to say to; ei\do~, but 
not just any ei\do~, specifi cally that ei\do~ which is “disclosed in speech.”17 Here the 
ei\do~ that in the Categories had been heard to pull toward the universal and the 
visual is at once tethered to morfhv, which holds fi rm to the contingent individual, 
and mediated by lovgo~, the manner in which beings are disclosed in speech.
In this shift from the universal and visual to the contingent and auditory, a 
certain temporality emerges; it is the temporality endemic to the very coming-
to-presence of ta; fusikav and expressed in the following sentence: “for what is 
bone or fl esh in potency [duvnamei] has not yet [ou[t’ e[cei pw] its nature nor does 
it exist by nature until [pri;n] it takes on the ei\do~ to; kata; to;n lovgon, by which we 
say what fl esh or bone is when defi ning it.”18 We hear in this “not yet”/“until” an 
440 Christopher P. Long
interval that escapes the lovgo~; yet it is an interval that resonates in every attempt 
to delimit the very coming-into-being of beings that become. These small words, 
‘ou[te . . . pw’ and ‘pri;n,’ gesture to an absence that cannot be captured by the grasp 
of the lovgo~. This interval, this absence, forces Aristotle’s thinking to vacillate, 
indeed, almost to repeat itself: “Thus, in another way, the nature of things having 
in themselves the principle of motion would be hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\do~, which is 
not separate other than in speech [kata; to;n lovgon].”19 Although we may speak of 
the nature of a being in terms of its form, it is impossible to separate out what a 
being is save through a certain kind of speaking. Thus, immediately after assert-
ing that “nature is morfhv,” Aristotle must offer a sort of palinode: “but the morfhv 
and the fuvsi~ is said in two ways, for the stevrhsi~, deprivation, is somehow 
[pwv~] ei\do~.”20 Aristotle’s tenacious engagement with the coming-to-presence of 
ta; fusikav has forced him to think absence itself as a sort of presence. The little 
word pwv~ however testifi es to the impossibility of such an act of hubris—this 
‘somehow,’ this ‘pwv~,’ points to the very limits of lovgo~.
These limits resonate in the various ways Aristotle himself says form. Nowhere 
is this heard more acutely than in the middle books of the Metaphysics, where an 
extraordinary set of articulations emerge as Aristotle puts language in the service 
of a thinking that remains assiduously loyal to the phenomenon that is oujsiva. In 
order to perceive this, however, we must listen with different ears; for the formu-
lations that disclose the limits of lovgo~ most distinctly have been systematically 
muted by a dense sediment of interpretation that has calcifi ed Aristotle’s living, 
dynamic and fl exible language into a codifi ed philosophical lexicon.
Form is Said in Many Ways: The Middle Books of the Metaphysics
Let us listen to yet another way Aristotle says form. In Metaphysics Z.3, Aristotle 
again brings morfhv and ei\do~ together as he distinguishes the various senses 
of uJpokeivmenon:
[I]n one way it is said to be matter, in another morfhv, in a third, that which is 
from these. (By matter I mean, for example, bronze, by morfhv the shape of the 
outward appearance [to; sch`ma th`~ ijdeva~], by that which is from these the 
statue as a composite.) Thus, if the ei\do~ is prior to and is being more than 
matter, then by the same lovgo~ it will be prior to that which is from both.21
Here the tension between morfhv and ei\do~ is again heard, for Aristotle says morfhv 
as he links form intimately to the shape and appearance of the composite, but 
as he considers the ontological priority of form, he says ei\do~. This is an echo of 
the tension discernable in the Categories between the qualitative and ontological 
understanding of form. It is a tension that resonates through the middle books of 
the Metaphysics as Aristotle seeks to defi ne the concrete composite oujsiva.
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In Z.4 Aristotle introduces the phrase to; tiv h\n ei\nai to designate that which 
each being is said to be in virtue of itself.22 Let us allow the oddity of the formula-
tion to hover in the air, as the familiarity of the traditional translation, ‘essence,’ 
mutes the manner in which the phrase itself both seeks to designate that which 
makes each being what it is and fails to capture it completely. At fi rst Aristotle 
seems to identify the tiv h\n ei\nai with that which is itself individual: “But the tiv h\n 
ei\nai is just a tovde ti, a this.”23 However, immediately thereafter, having insisted 
that there is only a defi nition when the name and its lovgo~ signify something 
primary, he suggests “[t]he tiv h\n ei\nai will belong to nothing that is not the ei\do~ 
of a gevno~.”24 Traditionally this sentence has been rendered something like: “[t]he 
essence will belong to nothing that is not the species of a genus.”25 The use of ei\do~ 
here in close conjunction with gevno~ legitimizes such translations, for indeed, as 
we have heard, ei\do~ carries with it something of the universal. In the Categories 
it was precisely the capacity to be said of multiple subjects that won it the title of 
oujsiva, albeit an oujsiva of secondary rank. It is no surprise, then, that as Aristotle 
seeks to further delineate the ontological role form plays in determining the nature 
of the composite, the vocabulary of morfhv should give way to that of ei\do~.
However, even here a tension can be heard, for Aristotle identifi es the tiv h\n 
ei\nai both with that which is a tovde ti and with the ei\do~. Further, in Z.5 Aristotle 
seems to recognize that the sorts of beings—like the snub and indeed all natural 
beings—that have matter as part of their nature cannot be defi ned exclusively 
in terms of their ei\do~.26 The tiv h\n ei\nai of such beings must include reference 
to matter as well as form. Here we feel the pull of morfhv once again—form must 
be thought together with matter, as determining principles of the composite. In 
response to this, Aristotle turns his attention in Z.7 to the manner in which beings 
come into being—and we again hear the voice of morfhv, though here speaking 
through its envoy, sch`ma: “We say what a bronze sphere is in both ways: both 
with respect to the matter when we say that it is bronze and with respect to the 
ei\do~ [when we say] that it is this sort of shape [sch`ma]; for this shape is the kind 
into which it is fi rst placed. Thus, the bronze sphere has matter in its lovgo~.”27 
In this passage, Aristotle links ei\do~ to sch`ma in order to insist upon the need 
to include matter in the account of composite individuals. He goes on to suggest 
that our common way of speaking hints at how matter must be mentioned in the 
defi nition of such composites, for “whenever a being has been generated [o{tan 
gevnhtai], that from which as matter it is generated is sometimes called, not that, 
but that-y, for example, the statue is not stone, but stony.”28
This peculiarity of language is heard, however, only when the being already ‘has 
become,’ ‘o{tan gevnhtai,’ that is, while we can speak of matter before it becomes a 
determinate being and we can articulate the material dimension of that being once 
it has already come into being, we are left with only a sort of gesture to the very 
coming into being of the being itself. If we listen attentively, we can hear precisely 
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such a gesture to the coming to presence of being in the vocabulary Aristotle deploys 
in his attempts to think the meaning of oujsiva. It is heard in the phrase ‘to; tiv h\n 
ei\nai,’ which speaks at once the imperfect tense of the Greek ‘ei\nai,’ ‘to be,’ and its 
infi nitive. The what is it question can only be answered in terms of the what-it-was-
to-be, to; tiv h\n ei\nai. The imperfect carries with it progressive aspect in past time, 
and although we are told that in this phrase the imperfect has no grammatically 
temporal sense, nevertheless, the phrase itself points to a certain temporality.29 For 
while the infi nitive affi rms the very presence of the being under consideration, the 
imperfect, with its progressive aspect, signifi es that this presence is always already 
somehow past. The phrase speaks the temporality of the phenomenon in its very 
coming to presence through a lovgo~ that always comes too late. The h\n marks the 
fi nitude of the lovgo~ through which beings come to presence.
The limit of this lovgo~ is again heard in Z.8 as Aristotle says form in yet another 
way: “But the [ei\do~] signifi es a such [toiovnde]; and it is not a this and a defi nite 
being, but what one makes or generates is a such from a this, and when it has been 
generated [o{tan gennhqh`/], it is a such this [tovde toiovnde].”30 Here a faint echo of the 
Categories, with its insistence that ei\do~ is a sort of quality, can be heard. Morfhv 
too, as inseparable from the composite, resonates in this passage, for Aristotle re-
jects the notion that ei\do~ is itself something defi nite and a this and thus capable 
of existing in separation from the composite. Yet what is most striking about the 
passage is the manner in which Aristotle gestures to the moment of individua-
tion that remains inaccessible to lovgo~. He does this in two ways. First, he uses a 
combination of demonstratives—‘tovde toiovnde’—to get at something of the very 
coming to presence of the individual. These gestures operate on the very boundary 
of lovgo~. As demonstratives, they are strange lovgoi intent on designating the trace 
of that which always escapes the grasp of the lovgo~—the very phenomenality of 
the phenomena.31 Second, Aristotle uses the temporal clause in conjunction with 
a verb in the aorist tense, with its completed aspect (o{tan gennhqh`/), to emphasize 
that the moment of individuation has already occurred. Before and after remain 
within the sphere of the lovgo~, for we may speak about a form prior to its inhering 
in some matter, or of a matter prior to its taking on form, and we can identify each 
being once it has already become, but its very coming-into-being remains muted 
and inaccessible.32 We must, with Aristotle, resort to linguistic gestures.
Such gestures operate on the frontier of the conceptual. In them we hear at 
once Aristotle’s intense loyalty to the phenomenality of the phenomena and his 
tenacious desire to know—eijdevnai: to see, to render conceptual, to subject to an 
ei\do~—the very coming into being of beings that become.33 This tension can be 
heard in Metaphysics H.1, where Aristotle fi nally clarifi es the meaning of tovde ti 
as it relates to matter, form and the composite:
Now an oujsiva is a uJpokeivmenon, and in one sense, it is matter (by matter I mean 
that which is not a tovde ti being-at-work [ejnergeiva/] but is a tovde ti in potency), 
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in another sense it is the lovgo~ and the morfhv, which is a tovde ti being separable 
in logo~; and [in a] third [sense] it is that which is from both, of which alone 
there is generation and destruction, and which is simply separable.34
Morfhv is heard here instead of ei\do~ as Aristotle attempts to think form and matter 
together as principles of the composite. Morfhv connotes this intimate connection 
between the form and its composite. Yet morfhv is again linked to lovgo~, to the very 
articulation of the being under consideration. While something like the formal 
dimension of the composite can be isolated in lovgo~, this form cannot be reifi ed 
into an ei\do~ existing independently of the composite in which it is found.
However, in this passage we hear in the word ‘ejnergeiva/,’ being-at-work, yet 
another, and this will be the fi nal and most decisive, way form is said by Aristotle. 
At the end of book H, Aristotle is concerned to address an aporia that emerges 
when the cause of a being is posited as existing in separation from that being 
itself. When this is the case, it is not clear how to account for the unity of the 
individual; for if a human being is what it is by participating in the idea of the 
Animal and the Biped, which themselves exist independently of the human being, 
then the human being will be two, not one—namely Animal and Biped. Aristotle 
suggests, however, that “if, as we say, the one is matter, the other morfhv, and the 
one is in potency [dunavmei], the other exists as being-at-work [ejnergeiva/], that 
which is being sought no longer seems to be an aporia. . . . What is responsible 
for that which exists in potency to be at-work aside from that which produces in 
however many things of which there is generation? But nothing else is responsible 
for the potential sphere to be a sphere at-work, but this was the tiv h\n ei\nai in 
each.”35 Here morfhv is said to designate the being-at-work of a being while matter 
is identifi ed with potency. Further, morfhv is now linked to tiv h\n ei\nai, which is 
understood to be an immanent principle of the being of the composite. Aristotle 
says morfhv here precisely because it points to form as intimately linked to the 
composite individual. However, the ontological effi cacy that had been associated 
with ei\do~ is now ascribed to morfhv which itself gives way to the vocabulary of tiv 
h\n ei\nai and “being-at-work,” ejnergeiva/.36 These later two expressions mark a shift 
in Aristotle’s thinking away from the static and structural toward the dynamic 
and functional. Indeed, while morfhv and ei\do~ are structural designations, tiv h\n 
ei\nai and ejnergeiva/ point to the ontological importance of the manner in which 
the composite itself functions.37 This way of speaking about beings recognizes 
that the being of a given being is ineluctably linked to what that being does.
Despite Aristotle’s ongoing tendency to elucidate the distinction between form, 
matter and the composite by appealing to heuristic examples taken from the sphere 
of human fabrication—a tendency that reinforces the structural over the func-
tional—Aristotle’s intense engagement with the manner in which natural beings 
themselves come into being has led him to think morfhv and ei\do~ together. Indeed, 
both tiv h\n ei\nai and ejnergeiva/ are ways of saying form that combine the competing 
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thrusts of morfhv and ei\do~. If morfhv cannot be separated from the being in which it 
inheres and if ei\do~ is an ontological principle capable of determining the very being 
of that of which it is the form, then tiv h\n ei\nai and ejnergeiva/ say in a fundamental 
way morfhv and ei\do~ together. To say hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\do~ is to recognize that an 
account of the being of ta; fusikav must assiduously attend to the ways such beings 
appear, it will, in short, require a lovgo~ of their very bivoi, that is, a certain biology.
The Phenomenology of Life: Aristotle’s Biology
Aristotle’s biological works enact the very phenomenology of natural beings our 
analysis of the interaction between morfhv and ei\do~ has suggested is required. 
These treatises do not present a taxonomy of the animal kingdom, but rather, as 
A. L. Peck suggests, they “collect data for ascertaining the causes of the observed 
phenomena.”38 This is accomplished by describing not animals so much as the 
similarities and differences between them.39 The incredible breadth of this ap-
proach can be felt at the beginning of the History of Animals, where Aristotle 
writes: “The differences of animals are those that relate to their manner of life 
[bivou~], their activities [pravxei~], their habits [h[qh] and their parts.”40 Aristotle’s 
biology is phenomenological: it describes the differences that emerge from the 
direct observation of animals existing in the world. Indeed, as Heidegger has 
suggested, “[z]whv,” for Aristotle, “is a concept of being, ‘life’ means a way of be-
ing, that is, a being-in-the-world. A living being is not simply present-at-hand, 
but rather is in a world in such a way that it has its world.”41 For this reason, the 
oJrismov~, or defi nition, of such beings must rigorously attend to their manner 
of life, their activities, their habits as well as their parts, for only a lovgo~ of an 
animal’s being-at-work, its ejnergeiva/, can stand as an adequate account of the 
what-it-was-for-a-being-to-be, that is, of its tiv h\n ei\nai.
Thus, at the beginning of Parts of Animals, Aristotle takes issue with Democritus 
who, he says, seeks to defi ne each animal exclusively in terms of its ‘sch`ma’ or ‘mor-
fhv.’ The problem with this, according to Aristotle, is that “though the confi guration 
of a corpse has the same shape [morfhv], it is nevertheless not a human being,” for, 
as he goes on to say, it will no longer be able to do its work.42 Democritus spoke too 
simply. Although he was in a certain sense right to point to morfhv in his attempt to 
determine the being of animals, he failed to the think morfhv and ei\do~ together in 
their intimate relation to matter, that is, he did not recognize that the being of each 
being is determined by its being-at-work, ejnergeiva/. An adequate account of the 
being of such beings cannot simply point to morfhv as shape, rather, it must describe 
in detail the manner of living, the actions, the habits and, indeed, the parts that 
manifest themselves as each animal functions in its world. As Aryeh Kosman puts 
it, “animals . . . exhibit most manifestly the fact that form and matter in substance-
being is linked to the concepts of activity and the structures of potentiality which 
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empower that activity. For the being of an animal consists in its life functions, in 
the characteristic activities and modes of living in which it engages.”43
Because natural beings are what they do, Aristotle’s biology must become a 
phenomenology of life. Its intent is to fi rst gather as many observations as possible 
in order then to go on to consider their causes.44 Aristotle pursues this purpose 
with the tenacity of an avid collector. However, as Walter Benjamin suggests, “there 
is in the life of a collector a dialectical tension between the poles of disorder and 
order.”45 Throughout the biological works, we feel this tension in Aristotle’s “spe-
cial interest” in animals that seem to defy classifi cation.46 The seal, for example, 
exhibits characteristics belonging to both land animals and water animals; for 
although, like land animals, they breathe air, do not take in water and sleep and 
breed on land, like aquatic animals, they spend most of their time in water and 
derive their food from it.47 Aristotle calls such creatures ejpamfoterivzonta, beings 
that tend toward both, or as Peck translates, “dualizers.”48 Apes, for example, tend 
toward both bipeds and quadrupeds; while bats tend toward both land dwellers 
and fl yers.49 And while Aristotle may ultimately classify such animals in one or 
the other of the categories toward which they tend, he seems to take a special 
joy in subverting his own classifi cations. Such “dualizers” stand as reminders of 
the limits of the lovgo~ that seeks to set the animal kingdom into order. They are 
symptoms of the tension of which Benjamin spoke.
This tension animates Aristotle’s phenomenological approach which at once 
seeks a general account while refusing to sacrifi ce the phenomenon for the sake 
of the theory, no matter how beautifully structured. This approach is poignantly 
expressed in On Generation and Corruption:
Inexperience is responsible for a weakening of the power to comprehend the 
agreed upon facts [ta; oJmologouvmena sunora`n]. Hence those who are more at 
home with the beings of nature are more able to lay down the sorts of prin-
ciples that admit of a wide and coherent development; while those whom a 
disposition to long discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts too 
easily show forth on the basis of a few observations.50
Aristotle recognizes that any comprehensive view [sunora`n] of the whole depends 
upon dwelling in intimate association with the beings of nature. Yet, he is never willing 
to sacrifi ce the phenomena for the sake of such a vision. He is at once driven to posit-
ing principles of wide and coherent development and yet aware that any principles 
not fi rmly grounded in the phenomena quickly give way to dogmatism. In the face 
of the allure of order, Aristotle remains ultimately loyal to the things themselves.
However, this tension between order and disorder is simply another expression 
of the tension we have heard between ei\do~ and morfhv at the level of form. For 
it results from Aristotle’s unwillingness to permit the hegemony of the ei\do~ to 
subvert the peculiarity of the phenomena. This loyalty to the phenomena forces 
Aristotle to say morfhv and ei\do~ together in order to think form as inseparably 
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bound to matter. The name for this, the dynamic identity of form and matter is 
ejnergeiva/, being-at-work. Yet, the very being-at-work which is the individual can-
not be captured by the ei\do~ alone; it is not merely a matter of seeing, but also a 
saying of matter in its being-at-work. This lovgo~ of ejnergeiva/ must tarry with the 
contingent individual and so become, quite literally, a lovgo~ of the phenomena. 
Such a phenomenology will at once rigorously attend to the lovgo~ through which 
beings come to presence and dwell in intimate association with their peculiar 
ways of being-in-the-world. Aristotle practices precisely such a phenomenology 
and so allows each being to express “something wonderful.”
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